Trumpism Is Not An Effective Electoral Strategy

Doug Jones is a solidly left wing Democrat who makes little effort to appeal to conservatives. Nevertheless, in 2017 he was able to win a Senate seat in Alabama, one of the reddest states in the nation.

In 2018, Democrats won the House popular vote by almost 9 points, and held on to Senate seats in Montana and West Virginia.

In 2019, Democrats took full control of the Virginia State Legislature after many years out of power.

In 2020, Donald Trump became the first President to lose re-election since George H.W. Bush was defeated by Bill Clinton in 1992.

In 2021, Democrats took control of the Senate.

On reflection, even Trump’s victory in 2016 was somewhat unimpressive. It’s very rare for any party to control the White House for more than 8 years at a time, and even so Trump lost the popular vote to one of the least popular major party nominees in history, and only just won the tipping point state and hence the Electoral College. In the end, the Trump era has been an electoral disaster for the GOP, going from full control of Federal Government in January 2017, to Democrats having full control just 4 years later. Now the Republican Party is facing an internal conflict over whether or not to retain Trumpism, and its decision could determine its electoral performance for the coming decade.

Fundamentally, the electoral Achilles ’ heel of Trumpism is that it caters exclusively to the base, passionate Republicans who are very positive about Trump. All of Trump’s actions, decisions, and rhetoric are aimed at this one group. But this group simply isn’t big enough. Trump’s approval rating currently sits at just 39%, fairly typical of his rating throughout his Presidency. But 39% is not enough to win an election, and in these same polls an average of 56% of voters say they disapprove of Trump’s Presidency. Trumpism demonstrates little ability to cater to moderates and persuadable voters, because it doesn’t consist of policies or arguments, it consists of emotion. Ultimately, Trumpism is the politics of resentment for those perceived to have better opportunities in life than yourself. In this politics of emotion, it seems to frequently become necessary to believe conspiracy theories to rationalise emotions such as hatred of top Democrats or distress regarding election results. But the vast majority of the public don’t support these theories, so unless you already feel what you need to feel to buy into Trumpism, there really isn’t much out there to convince you to vote Republican right now.

Nothing represents this better than the failure of the GOP to publish a new manifesto in 2020, the first time a major party has missed a manifesto in decades. Instead, Trump chose to reuse his 2016 manifesto, which contains various outdated policies and ideas and is of course absent of any policies regarding Covid-19. Then again, having no policies regarding Covid-19 is reflective of a President who has sought to avoid engaging with the issue, instead focusing on attacking his critics online and hosting rallies, once again playing on emotion rather than policy. Entertainingly, this document which the GOP came to embrace in 2020 also contains various direct criticisms of “The President”, referring to Obama in 2016 but now reading as though Trump were attacking himself: “The President has been regulating to death a free market economy that he does not like and does not understand. He defies the laws of the United States by refusing to enforce those with which he does not agree”. The laziness of copy and pasting the manifesto verbatim is symbolic of Trumpism’s lack of interest in the actual process of governing a nation.

Furthermore, we see that Trump himself performs worse than other GOP nominees, and that the greater distance Republicans have from the White House, the better they do. In 2020, Trump lost the popular vote by 4.5 points, but the GOP only lost the House popular vote by 3. Based on the State Legislative seats which went up for election in 2020, we estimate that if every seat had gone up for election, Republicans would actually have won the State Legislative popular vote by 1 point. In the House and Senate, the Republicans who performed best as compared to Trump were consistently those who most frequently vote against him in Congress. This has a major impact in elections, with all 4 Democratic Senate gains made against Republican incumbents who voted with Trump 80-95% of the time despite being from competitive states.

On the other hand, it’s not entirely clear what strategy Republicans could employ other than Trumpism. Both the moderate and calm McCain in 2008 and the traditional conservative Romney in 2012 suffered clear defeats. The last time the Republicans won the Presidential popular vote was in 2004, but George W Bush went on to become a deeply unpopular President with a stained legacy, so his strategy is hardly one Republicans wish to replicate. Before that, Republicans have George H.W. Bush’s victory in 1988 to look to, except that he was defeated convincingly by Clinton just 4 years later. Therefore the GOP has to look a full 40 years into the past to Ronald Reagan and his “Reaganonomics” to find any proven electoral strategy for conservatives. The GOP’s identity crisis is certainly severe, but lacking any policies or recent examples of successful strategies, it seems overwhelmingly likely that the Republican party will end up stuck with some degree of Trumpism, and all the electoral challenges it entails.

What Biden’s Win Means For The Political Landscape

After months of voting, counting, and waiting, the General Election is finally over, and it’s bad news for Republicans. In the end, Biden won the popular vote by a fairly convincing 4.5 point margin. This is substantially less than what most opinion polls were predicting, but was still just enough to bring Biden to a victory. Not only did Democrats win back the key swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, they also picked up Ariziona and Georgia from the Sun Belt, both of which are extremely promising states for the party moving forward. However, in a sense Biden’s margin of victory was quite narrow, as he won the tipping point state of Wisconsin by just 0.6 points, meaning that Trump’s Electoral College advantage was approximately 4 points. Republicans also seem to be solidifying their control of Florida and North Carolina, quashing Democrats’ hopes in these populous and fast growing states.

In the Senate, we expected many of the key races to be close. In the end, many of these toss-ups ended up going to Republicans, continuing the trend we see in these results of Democrats underperforming their polls. The GOP held on in North Carolina and Iowa, and unseated Doug Jones in Alabama, demonstrating once again that incumbency is worth much less than party identity in the current political paradigm, making it extremely difficult for Democrats to hang on in red states and vice versa. Indeed, the vast majority of Senate seats once again simply went to the same party that won the Presidential race in that state. Democrats benefited from this trend by picking up seats in Colorado and Arizona, as well as 2 impressive wins in Georgia, giving Democrats the majority in the Senate they so desperately needed. The sole exception to the rule was Republican Susan Collins in Maine, whose moderate reputation allowed her to clinch a narrow victory in a blue state.

The House was a major source of disappointment for Democrats. While polling indicated the party may enjoy slight gains, instead their majority has been shrunk severely. Those Democrats who remain are a fairly cohesive coalition so should still be somewhat effective, however House votes won’t be the sure thing they once were. Overall across Presidential and Congressional races, we called 98% correctly. Our incorrect calls were all cases of underestimating Republicans, primarily based off inaccurate opinion polling.

Overall, this is a huge win for Democrats. With control of Congress and the White House, they will be able to pass Covid relief bills, implement executive orders, and appoint cabinet secretaries and justices as they please. However, their slim majorities in Congress will likely prevent them from implementing anything radical, as even a couple of Blue Dog Democrats voting against a bill would be enough to block it entirely. Furthermore, they are likely to lose those majorities in the 2022 midterms, meaning they will need to use these 2 years very effectively before Congress becomes split and deadlocked once again.

This election also serves as a vindication of the establishment wing of the Democratic party, demonstrating that mainstream left wing politicians are in fact capable of beating Republicans. This could put the brakes on the Progressive wing of the party, who had previously been arguing that only a radical populist Democrat could excite voters enough to win. It seems likely that in 2024, the Democrats will nominate Biden or Harris for the Presidency, with AOC or any other successor to Bernie Sanders sidelined. Conversely, the GOP may be forced to rethink its strategy. A President failing to win re-election is unusual, as is losing a Senate majority within just 4 years. Whether Republicans stick with Trumpism or fall back to the traditional conservatism of figures such as Mitt Romney will be enormously impactful, and doubtless a major political conflict over the next 4 years.

Finally, Republican structural advantages were cemented and expanded this election, most notably in Trump’s 4 point advantage in the Electoral College, increased from 3 points in 2016. It is entirely possible to envision a scenario where in 2024 or 2028 the Republican nominee wins the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote by 5-10 million ballots. Additionally, the GOP did surprisingly well in State Legislative races, giving them extensive control of the redistricting process coming up in 2021. Meanwhile in many of the states that Democrats do control, they allow the redistricting to be carried out by independent commissions. Ultimately this is likely to mean that Republicans continue to have significant structural advantages in elections for the House and State Legislatures for the next 10 years counterbalancing Democrats’ larger coalition.

Democrats Are Likely To Win Full Control Of Congress

With the 2020 General Election just a few days away, Democrats command convincing 9 point leads in both the generic ballot and Presidential opinion polling. Although Republicans have structural advantages in the House, Senate, and Electoral College, the size of the Democratic lead results in a grim outlook for the GOP this cycle.

Our probabilistic forecasts for the House, Senate, and Presidential races are complete and have been tracking the changing national environment over time. Since the first Presidential debate and Trump’s subsequent coronavirus diagnosis, the President lost the small gains he achieved following the Republican National Convention. This article explores our current forecasts for the House and the Senate. Although these might not be the most high profile contests this year, they are absolutely pivotal in determining whether the winner of the Presidential race will be able to govern effectively, or will simply be a placeholder keeping the next President’s seat warm for four years.

The House of Representatives

Following their blue wave in 2018, Democrats go into this year’s House elections with 232 representatives, a comfortable majority. To regain control, Republicans need to make extensive gains in an environment even more favourable to Democrats than the 8.5 point lead they enjoyed in 2018. Additionally, Democrats now have the advantage of incumbency in almost every swing seat, having won them off Republican incumbents 2 years ago. As a result, our model gives Democrats a 98% chance of maintaining control of the House, and actually expects them to expand their majority, winning 240 seats on average.

The Senate

In a chamber where California gets the same number of representatives as Wyoming, Democrats are always going to struggle. The Republican structural advantage in the Senate is immense, such that even in 2018 Republicans were able to expand their majority, and now occupy 53 out of the 100 seats. However, in 2018 Democrats had very high exposure in the Senate, with the vast majority of the seats up for election that year occupied by Democrats. This gave the GOP plenty of chances to pick off some of the less secure Democrats in red states they’d won courtesy of excellent years for Democrats in 2006 and 2012. In 2020, the tables are turned as the GOP seeks to hold onto the gains it made in 2014. Now Republicans have high exposure, and could suffer significant losses in this very blue national environment.

12 Democratic and 23 Republican seats are up for election this year, including many Republican held seats in moderately red states. To win control Democrats need to make a net gain of 3 or 4, depending on whether Kamala Harris or Mike Pence is elected to the Vice Presidency, which breaks ties in the Senate. The GOP stands to make a fairly easy gain unseating Doug Jones in Alabama. Following his victory in one of the reddest states in the country as a result of facing an exceptionally unpopular opponent in Roy Moore, Jones has been voting consistently with the Democratic mainstream. It appears he decided that even if he voted as a conservative Democrat in a similar manner to Joe Manchin in deep red West Virginia, Jones would still lose his re-election campaign, so has simply been voting with his party. The only other Republican target is Michigan, where Democrat Gary Peters is facing a small threat to his re-election campaign, but will probably pull through given that Peters and Biden are both consistently leading polls in the state.

Given Biden’s lead in national polling, it’s reasonable to assume that Democrats therefore need to make approximately 4 gains to win control of the Senate. Colorado is an obvious target, Biden is leading there by 14 points and incumbent Cory Gardener has made little effort to appeal to moderates in the state, and trails in polls by a significant margin. If Democrats can’t win this one, they can’t win.

Arizona presents a second strong target for Democrats. This swing state is currently leaning towards Biden, and the Republican incumbent Martha McSally is only an appointed incumbent, not an elected one, and is therefore not expected to command a significant incumbent advantage. Interestingly, in 2018 McSally lost Republican Jeff Flake’s old Senate seat to Democrat Kyrsten Sinema, so if McSally loses again this year she will have been responsible for the GOP losing both Arizona Senate seats in the space of 2 years!

Beyond these 2 targets, Democrats have to work harder to make gains. Maine is a slightly blue state, but incumbent Republican Susan Collins has a moderate reputation, putting her in a much stronger political position than Gardener or McSally. However, since voting in favour of confirming Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, voters in Maine are increasingly questioning her moderate reputation. She trails slightly in polling, but this is a race that could easily go either way.

Iowa and North Carolina are each somewhat red states with Republican incumbents, so the fact that Democratic challengers have small leads in each of these states is a reflection on the national political situation being very favourable toward Democrats. Additionally, Democrats are only slightly behind in Montana, Kansas, Arkansas, South Carolina, and both races in Georgia. All of these are red states with Republican incumbents, the fact that Democrats are even in contention here must be alarming for the GOP.

All in all, Democrats have 2 easy opportunities to make gains, and 9 highly competitive races which could go either way. If Democrats win even just a couple of those, they win the Senate. That’s why our model gives Democrats an 81% chance of taking control of the upper chamber. An important note is that the margin could also be extremely important here. If Democrats have only 50 Senators, they would be reliant on conservative Democrat Joe Manchin, whose vote could not be counted on for any liberal policies. If Democrats have 52 seats things are very different, and if Biden were President he could probably pass mainstream Democratic reform through Congress easily. With 55 seats or more, Democrats could run rampant passing whatever progressive policies they so choose, so truly every single competitive race could have an immense impact on politics going forward.

Whilst this piece has focused on the more likely scenario of Democratic victory, it’s worth emphasising the fact that the 2% and 19% chances of Republicans winning the House and Senate respectively are real and should not be ignored. But to hold on even in just the upper chamber, the GOP has a lot of ground to make up. Aside from Susan Collins, Republicans in key races show very limited interest in using moderate rhetoric and policy positions to persuade Independent voters, leading Independents to overwhelmingly back Democrats. While passionate conservative messaging does encourage Republican turnout, it also fires up Democratic turnout, such that Republicans find themselves having to play defence deep within their own territory. If the GOP does indeed suffer a severe defeat this year, they may have to re-examine this strategy.

What The 2019 Election Results Do and Don’t Tell Us

The votes are in, and the headlines are big wins for Democrats in Virginia, where they took full control of state government, and Kentucky, where they overcame partisanship to win a gubernatorial race in one of the reddest states in the country (albeit by just half a point). But Republicans did manage to hold on to full control in Mississippi, and conservatives saw some success in ballot measures. Naturally there are already a huge variety of hot takes on what this all means, let’s break the main ones down one by one.

This was a good night for Democrats

True. Across the board, Democrats significantly overperformed the partisanship of their districts and states by an average of 5 points, with that advantage rising  to about 9 points in races with no Republican incumbent. These figures approximately match other indicators of the mood of the electorate, such as the congressional generic ballot showing Democrats 6-7 points ahead. Additionally, polls pitting theoretical Democratic Presidential nominees against Trump show 5-7 point leads for Warren and Sanders, with Biden holding an even greater lead. All in all Democrats can rest easy that the national environment is distinctly blue, although not quite as blue as it was in 2018, when Democrats won the House popular vote by 8 and a half points. Furthermore, Democrats and left-leaning Independents are clearly highly motivated, displaying very high turnout for an odd year election. In future analysis we should be operating with the prior assumption that something significant has to change before Republicans can dream of winning the popular vote.

The results show Trump will lose re-election

False. Elections this far away from Presidential races simply are not good indicators of voting intention so far in the future. For example, Democrats suffered heavy electoral defeats throughout Obama’s first term, yet he went on to win re-election fairly comfortably. With Trump himself on the ballot, perhaps Republican turnout will rise to match that of Democrats. Or maybe Democrats will fail to convince the nation that Trump should be impeached, yet still go ahead and impeach him. The Democratic nominee could be perceived negatively, perhaps for extreme left wing positions in Warren’s case, or old age in Biden’s. And don’t forget the Electoral College which in 2016 gave Trump an advantage of about 2 and a half points, and the political wisdom that incumbent Presidents typically win re-election. If anything, the takeaway here is that 2020 will be very competitive.

2020 turnout will be at a record high

True (probably!) We’ve now seen exceptionally high turnout in both 2018 and 2019, with many of last night’s elections showing higher turnout than the 2014 midterms. All the data points suggest a deeply politically engaged electorate who are keen to come out and vote, especially for or against the President. Healthcare, immigration and gun control also appear to motivate voters a great deal, and there will be enormous contrast between Democratic and Republican policy on all three of these issues, regardless of who Democrats nominate. 2020 turnout in excess of 70% (compared to 55% in 2016) is entirely plausible. Who this would benefit is another question. Ethnic minorities and young voters are the traditional low turnout demographics. If increased electoral engagement is driven by these groups then Democrats could be at a big advantage. That said, every demographic has room for turnout to increase substantially. This is a case where the details are everything.

Split ticket voting is alive and well

False. Sure, Kentucky voted for a Democratic governor, yet voted against Democrats down the ballot by margins of around 20 points. But this really was an exceptional case, on par with Roy Moore’s ill-fated 2017 bid for an Alabaman Senate seat. Matt Bevin was the least popular governor in the country, with a net approval rating of about -25, and a net approval of only +11 points among Republicans. He won just 52% of the vote in his primary and is infamous for putting both of his feet in his mouth at once, for example when he “guaranteed” that children in Kentucky were being sexually assaulted as the result of a teacher strike. Overall in recent elections there is very little evidence of significant ticket splitting, and in 2020 we should expect the vast majority of voters to vote the same way in all races.

Mitch McConnell’s re-election is at risk

False. We can be fairly sure that the Senate Majority Leader won’t be losing his seat in 2020. He is certainly a remarkably unpopular senator given the partisanship of Kentucky, with approval ratings comparable to those of Bevin. But the crucial difference is that McConnell is up for re-election in a presidential year. All the media attention will be on the presidential race, and Trump’s presence at the top of the ballot will help out any struggling Republicans in red states. In 2016, every state voted the same way for the Presidency and the Senate. In 2018, we saw further evidence that party identification is becoming a much more important factor than the specific person running for office, especially in federal races. We should therefore continue to assume that so long as Kentucky is safe for Trump, it’s safe for McConnell.

One last thing: Democrats now control the entire Virginian legislative and executive branches, will they seek to aggressively gerrymander Virginian seats in their favor? Before they came into power in the state, Democrats vigorously supported a bill seeking to create an independent redistricting commission. That bill has now made quite a bit of progress, but its successful passage would prevent Democrats from capitalizing on their gains in 2019 to draw maps designed to elect as many Democrats as possible. So the question is, will they hold fast to their established anti-gerrymandering position, or will 10 years of massive electoral advantages be too great a temptation to resist?

 

What The Midterms Results Tell Us About Politics

The madness of the midterms is over, and the results are pretty much as expected, with Republicans building up their Senate majority but losing the House. In fact, of the races called so far, our model correctly predicted the overall results of 97.2% of them. We predicted a Senate result of 48 Democrats to 52 Republicans, very close to the probable final result of 47-53. The House model gave a similarly accurate prediction of 239-196, against the probable final result of 234-201. At first the night looked tough for Democrats, with mixed early results in Florida, a slight surprise in the defeat of Indiana Democratic Senator Joe Donnelly, and the defeat of Amy McGrath in Kentucky’s 6th congressional district. These early results seem to have played an outsized role in forming the narrative of the election, that of a good but still disappointing night for Democrats. But make no mistake, this was a blue wave. Democrats successfully competed in suburbs to win a solid majority in the House, won the popular vote by a wide margin (about 8 points), and did surprisingly well in the Senate given that this year’s map was very good for Republicans.

The next most significant takeaway is probably that incumbency matters much less than it has in the past. America voted along partisan lines to an unprecedented extent, with very little ticket-splitting. The highest profile casualties of this were Democratic Senators in the red states of Missouri, Indiana, and North Dakota. Even in Montana and West Virginia where the Democratic Senate incumbents won, they did so by surprisingly small margins, and in Florida, which isn’t even that red, Republican Rick Scott beat Democratic incumbent Bill Nelson. By the way, watch out for Rick Scott in 2024, a popular and seasoned Governor come Senator from a swing state, whose term is ending in a Presidential year, is definitely someone to be aware of when the rumours about who’s running for President start to circulate.

Next, voter engagement was off the charts, with a turnout of 49%, the highest midterm turnout since 1914! This isn’t even much lower than the 56% turnout for the Presidential race in 2016. Of course these numbers are still very low compared to most Western democracies, but if this trend holds it seems perfectly plausible that we see extraordinary turnout in 2020 when the fate of Trump’s Presidency will truly be in play, 70% turnout begins to seem perfectly possible.

Thirdly, healthcare is by far and away the most prominent issue in politics right now. Democrats built their campaign on protecting the healthcare system, and to some extent it drove their victory, as it seems to be an argument they are winning – in a recent poll, 44% of those sampled said they trusted Democrats more on healthcare, compared to just 34% for Republicans. The next most important issue was immigration, perhaps unsurprisingly given Trump making a migrant caravan in Mexico a prominent issue during the final days of the campaign. These were followed by the economy, then gun control. It’s likely that these are the issues that will shape the elections in 2020, as politicians can see the incredible extent to which they have engaged the public. An economic downturn could spell the end of the Trump Presidency, or continued growth could form the basis of his re-election campaign. And it seems beyond doubt that the Democratic nominee will make healthcare a major talking point, and bring it up as often as they can.

Thinking about 2020, 2018 taught us a lot about what the electoral map is going to look like in 2 years time. Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania all veered away from Republicans, while Democrats enjoyed little joy in the Sun Belt. The Sun Belt is a collection of Southern and South-Western states which lean Republican, but Democrats dream of turning blue by turning out large ethnic minorities. The Sun Belt usually means Florida, North Carolina, Arizona, and sometimes Georgia and Texas too for the more ambitious Democrats. The best path to victory for Democrats in 2020 is now clearly via the Upper Midwestern states, which gives extra weight to Joe Biden and Amy Klobuchars’ potential Presidential campaigns, as they both have proven ability to appeal to Midwestern voters. But don’t discount Beto O’Rourke. He may have lost, but in a way that’s good for him, he now has more time to build up his campaign infrastructure, visit the early primary states, and prepare for another battle. He lost by a surprisingly small margin of only 2.6 points, and managed to electrify and thrill the Democratic base in a way that no one has really done since Obama. Add that to extraordinary fundraising abilities, and you have a very very strong contender for the Presidency.

Final Midterm Forecasts

The election is now almost here, and the final RedvBlue forecast is interesting but overall fairly clear and decisive. The top line is that Democrats have about a 10% chance of winning control of both chambers of Congress. The Republicans have a similar chance of full control, and in the remaining 80% of cases, the Democrats will win the House, but the Republicans will hold onto the Senate.

Warning: The approximately 10% chance that Democrats win the Senate and the 10% chance that Republicans win the House are very real. This means that if the election ran a hundred times, we would expect these things to happen about 10 times each. This election is not a dead certainty, and elections are nothing if not surprising, so be prepared!

The Senate

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Republicans Ted Cruz and Marsha Blackburn of Texas and Tennessee respectively seem to have successfully fended off fierce challenges from Democrats, and are looking confidently ahead in the polls. The bad news for Republicans is that the Democratic incumbents in deep red states seem to have largely consolidated their positions. West Virginia and Montana look remarkably safe for Democrats, and though the model’s predictions in Missouri and Indiana are nowhere close to certain, the GOP seems significantly behind in both. Only North Dakota has proven vulnerable to Republican efforts to make gains, but this may very well be enough. The highly competitive races remaining in the Senate are Nevada, Arizona, and North Dakota, and Democrats need all 3 to win a majority. Nevada and Arizona are now almost perfect 50:50 toss-ups, it’s really anybody’s guess who’ll win those. But the two states are relatively similar, so it’s reasonable to imagine that they’ll both choose the same party. Meanwhile Democrats need Heidi Heitkamp to pull off a small miracle in North Dakota in order to secure the seat, which has been looking increasingly vulnerable as the election has progressed.

Due to tiny Democratic leads in Nevada and Arizona, going on a seat by seat basis the model predicts that the composition of the Senate will become 50-50, with Vice President Mike Pence giving Republicans the casting vote. But due to the high exposure of several red state Democrats, and very low exposure of the GOP, the average prediction given by the model is that Republicans will come out of the midterms with 52 Senate seats, against only 48 Democrats. The most likely scenario in which this happens would be that Republicans win in North Dakota, Nevada and Arizona.

The House

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By contrast, the Republicans would need a small miracle to win in the House. Democrats need 23 gains to take control, and New York, California, and New Jersey put together provide almost enough competitive races to allow for that on their own. Democrats are looking great in the New York seats, and in California they’re assisted by there not even being a Republican on the ballot for the Senate race, potentially causing some Republican voters to not bother turning out. However, Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey is looking unusually weak this year, having been caught up in a significant scandal, this might weaken Democratic chances across the state. But then there are simply so many other good options for the party to pick up the seats they need. Democrats are looking much stronger across the Midwest than they did in 2016, and Pennsylvania and Minnesota are both heavily laden with competitive districts. On a seat by seat basis, the model predicts the House will go 231-204 in favour of Democrats, representing a net gain of 36 seats. In the House it’s Republicans who are heavily exposed, so the average net gain predicted by the model is 44 seats, leading to a 239-196 House composition, a strong Democratic majority.

Predictions In Full

Here is a full list of our final calls. Although some of these races are toss-ups, this is who we think would win in each race if we had to choose.

Senate – Democratic Wins (Includes Independents who caucus with Democrats)

Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Minnesota Special, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,  Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.

Senate – Republican Wins

Mississippi, Mississippi Special, Nebraska, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming.

House – Democratic Wins

Alabama – 7
Alaska – none
Arizona – 1-3, 7, 9
Arkansas – none
California – 2, 3, 5-7, 9-20, 24-41, 43-49, 51-53
Colorado – 1, 2, 6, 7
Connecticut – 1-5
Delaware – at large
Florida – 5, 7, 9, 10, 13-15, 20-24, 26, 27
Georgia – 2, 4, 5, 13
Hawaii – 1, 2
Idaho – none
Illinois – 1-11, 14, 17
Indiana – 1, 7
Iowa – 1-3
Kansas – 2, 3
Kentucky – 3
Louisiana – 2
Maine – 1, 2
Maryland – 2-8
Massachusetts – 1-9
Michigan – 5, 8, 9, 11-14
Minnesota – 1-5, 7
Mississippi – 2
Missouri – 1, 5
Montana – none
Nebraska – none
Nevada – 1, 3, 4
New Hampshire – 1, 2
New Jersey – 1-3, 5-12
New Mexico – 1, 3
New York – 3-10, 12-20, 22, 25, 26
North Carolina – 1, 4, 9, 12
North Dakota – none
Ohio – 3, 9, 11, 13
Oklahoma – none
Oregon – 1, 3-5
Pennsylvania – 2-8, 17, 18
Rhode Island – 1, 2
South Carolina – 6
South Dakota – none
Tennessee – 5, 9
Texas – 7, 9, 15, 16, 18, 20, 28-30, 33-35
Utah – 4
Vermont – at large
Virginia – 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11
Washington – 1, 2, 6-10
West Virginia – none
Wisconsin – 2-4
Wyoming – none

House – Republican Wins

Alabama – 1-6
Alaska – at large
Arizona – 4-6, 8
Arkansas – 1-4
California – 1, 4, 8, 21-23, 42, 50
Colorado – 3-5
Connecticut – none
Delaware – none
Florida – 1-4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 16-19, 25
Georgia – 1, 3, 6-12, 14
Hawaii – none
Idaho – at large
Illinois – 12, 13, 15, 16, 18
Indiana – 2-6, 8, 9
Iowa – 4
Kansas – 1, 4
Kentucky – 1, 2, 4-6
Louisiana – 1, 3-6
Maine – none
Maryland – 1
Massachusetts – none
Michigan – 1-4, 6, 7, 10
Minnesota – 6, 8
Mississippi – 1, 3, 4
Missouri – 2-4, 6-8
Montana – at large
Nebraska – 1-3
Nevada – 2
New Hampshire – none
New Jersey – 4
New Mexico – 2
New York – 1, 2, 11, 21, 23, 24, 27
North Carolina – 2, 3, 5-8, 10, 11, 13
North Dakota – at large
Ohio – 1, 2, 4-8, 10, 12, 14-16
Oklahoma – 1-5
Oregon – 2
Pennsylvania – 1, 9-16
Rhode Island – none
South Carolina – 1-5, 7
South Dakota – at large
Tennessee – 1-4, 6-8
Texas – 1-6, 8, 10-14, 17, 19, 21-27, 31, 32, 36
Utah – 1-3
Vermont – none
Virginia – 1, 2, 5, 6, 9
Washington – 3-5
West Virginia – 1-3
Wisconsin – 1, 5-8
Wyoming – at large

Top 6 2020 Presidential Frontrunners

Predictions as of 10/22/2018, as Republicans take a lead in Nevada and Arizona, they look almost sure to hold on to the Senate, while Democrats’ popular vote lead sees them well ahead in the House:

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The 2020 Presidential campaign began on Wednesday November 9th 2016, when America woke up to discover Trump’s victory. The race may not officially begin until late 2019, but the battle has already begun, and is sure to intensify the day the midterms are done. Since 2016, the President has made it clear that he intends to run for re-election in 2020, and a rather large number of Democrats have been setting themselves up to challenge him, not to mention several #NeverTrump Republicans. But who actually has a chance of winning?

6. Vice President Joe Biden

On first glance, Joe Biden is a strong candidate for the Presidency. He has the name recognition to cut through a Democratic nomination process that could easily involve 20+ candidates. With 7 terms in the Senate and 2 terms in the Vice-Presidency, no one could ever question his experience. Combine this with his close relation to Obama, who is now seen as practically the father of modern Democratic politics, and he seems a strong contender to win the nomination. Having done so, he could run a campaign on his traditionally moderate politics. He’s always tried to position himself as a man of the people, and his trips to Wisconsin and Michigan clearly indicate some thought about a potential 2020 strategy. Add to this the fact that he was born in Pennsylvania, perhaps the most important swing state in the country at the moment, and he may seem like the perfect answer to Trump.

But Biden has run for the Presidency twice before, in 1988 and 2008, losing horribly both times. 1988 is particularly interesting, as Biden was considered a strong candidate from the very beginning, until he was destroyed by a long string of controversies: Accusations of plagiarizing speeches from the leader of the British Labour Party, as well as Robert F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, and Hubert Humphrey; involvement in plagiarism whilst he was at law school; lying about graduating in the top half of his class (he came 76th/85); claiming he earned 3 degrees when in fact he only got 1; and claiming that he received a full scholarship, when in fact he only got a half-scholarship. Biden is also, to be blunt, very old, currently aged 75. This means that by the end of a two term Presidency starting in 2021, he would be 86 years old. On top of the obvious mental and physical health concerns associated with this, it’s worth noting that during the primaries for the midterms, Democrats have tended to prefer younger, female candidates, and anti-establishment candidates have also been doing a little better than expected. Joe Biden is very strong on paper, and has a perfectly good shot, but it seems as though his time has probably come and gone.

5. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand

So how about a young(er), more liberal, female Democrat? Elected once to the House and thrice to the Senate, soon to become four times as she romps to victory in her New York re-election bid, Kirsten Gillibrand may well be the new face of the Democratic Party. With the weight of the mighty New York Democrats behind her, she is a fundraising titan, with $20 million raised towards defending her perfectly safe Senate seat this cycle alone. And though she may be a full blown liberal today, at the beginning of her political career she was a much more moderate Democrat, something she could plausibly call upon once she’s got the nomination in the bag and needs to appeal to the nation as a whole. On the other hand, her ties to the Clinton family and her being a female New York Democrat may well make it very easy for her to become linked in voters’ minds to Hillary Clinton, which would almost certainly not be a good thing for her campaign. Interestingly, unlike some on this list, she hasn’t yet visited Iowa or New Hampshire, the early primary states, which is considered a key step in building up for a Presidential campaign. Even unconventional candidates like Trump visit these states well before the primaries begin, so this might indicate that she isn’t yet sure about running in 2020, hence her place near the bottom of this list.

4. Senator Kamala Harris

Who’s an even more powerful and wealthy ally in a Democratic primary process than the New York Democrats? The California Democrats of course! Kamala Harris is one of a tiny group of candidates who could have a chance at outmatching Gillibrand on fundraising, and is another comparatively young female Senator. She’s even more liberal than Gillibrand, and although she is relatively new to the Senate, this could almost work in her favour, as younger Democrats seem keen to get rid of the old guard of the Party. As if this weren’t enough, she is the best candidate on this list for appealing to the Democrats’ African-American base, which is crucial during primaries. This could also be very useful during a general election. Although many Democrats believe that their path to victory in 2020 is to regain the Upper Midwest, specifically Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, this is hardly their only plausible route. By motivating African-American turnout, Harris could make a serious play for Florida and North Carolina, and perhaps even make Georgia and Arizona genuinely competitive. With the Trump campaign also needing to defend slim and faltering majorities in the Upper Midwest, this strategy could make for a very strong campaign indeed.

3. Senator Bernie Sanders

To all intents and purposes, Bernie Sanders is already running for President. His 2016 campaign never truly ended, and support for him is still strong within the party. He’s visited the early primary states of Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina, and even has a book out this year. The real question is not whether he will run, but whether he can win. We can clearly see from the 2016 primaries that he has a lot of support, he won 43% of delegates and only narrowly lost the popular vote to Hillary Clinton. That said, Clinton was not an especially popular candidate among Party members, hardly inspiring the levels of enthusiasm Obama or Sanders generated. So if Sanders couldn’t beat Clinton, could he beat any of the candidates on this list?

Furthermore, at 77 he’s even older than Biden, there has been some talk of a one term pledge, where he promises not to run for re-election, but not from Sanders himself, and it’s likely that such a pledge would harm him during the nomination process as Democrats will be keen to get a strong incumbent into office to secure a win in 2024. In a general election, he may struggle due to being perceived as a socialist, which is still a word with strong negative associations for many Americans, particularly those in high turnout demographics. Despite all this, he is almost definitely running, he has an established base of enthusiastic supporters, and extreme views are growing more popular and electable, as President Trump shows. Sanders is going to be a political heavyweight during the primaries, and his chances should not be underestimated.

2. Senator Elizabeth Warren

Elizabeth Warren is Hillary Clinton’s natural successor, and the one to watch in the Democratic primaries. She has her finger on the pulse of the party, is generally a very skilled politician, and has incredible fundraising abilities with the support of the Massachusetts Democrats, having raised $34 million for her totally uncompetitive re-election campaign this year. She was outspoken on opposing Kavanaugh, has been a fierce Trump critic since the beginning of the 2016 campaign, and was rumoured to be a possible VP pick for Clinton. She has strong support from the left and centre of the Party membership and from across the party establishment – she even received two electoral votes for the Vice Presidency in 2016 from faithless electors. She is running, and she is utterly formidable. A political juggernaut like her on the left wing of the Party may well instantly knock Gillibrand and Sanders out of the running after the first couple of primaries, and if she manages to win the Democratic nomination she would be a similarly fierce candidate against Trump. The only conceivable mark against her is her close association with the deeply unpopular Clinton, which will likely be quietly harming her campaign throughout the process.

1. President Donald Trump

This one is obvious. We know he’s running, we know he’s so popular amongst Republican members that he’s practically guaranteed the nomination, and as an incumbent in an age of two term Presidents we know he has a good shot at winning. His unpopularity is overblown, he’s managing about 42% approval ratings, only slightly worse than Obama’s were at this point in his Presidency. Although the 2018 midterms are looking to be messy for the GOP, holding level in the Senate and losing about 40 House seats, the 2010 midterms were much worse for Obama, with the Democrats losing 6 seats in the Senate and 63 in the House. This all suggests that Trump should be just fine in 2020.

On the other hand, Obama had a lot more room for error between his campaigns. In 2008, he was elected with a 7.2 point popular vote margin and 365 electoral votes, whereas Trump actually lost the popular vote by 2.1 points in 2016 and received only 304 electoral votes. Obama could comfortably afford to lose North Carolina, Indiana, and the 2nd congressional district in Nebraska in 2012 and see his popular vote margin shrink to 3.9 points, while still winning very well. Trump has no such luxuries in 2020. He needs to hold on to very narrow margins in Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, as well as protecting unreliable Republican majorities in North Carolina, Ohio, Iowa and Arizona. He can afford to lose one or two of these, but no more. In terms of opportunities to attack, Trump has New Hampshire, Nevada and perhaps Maine at large. With only 4, 6 and 2 electoral votes respectively, none of these are very exciting for him. However, Minnesota has a full 10 electoral votes, and although it hasn’t voted for a Republican Presidential nominee since 1972, Clinton only won it by 1.5 points in 2020, so Minnesota is very much on the table and could potentially turn the election on its head. Trump is by far and away the most likely candidate to win the Presidency in 2020, despite a variety of strong potential challengers setting themselves up to face him down, and the power of incumbency should not be underestimated.

Kavanaugh And Legitimacy

Predictions as of 10/7/2018, as predicted, fresh polls showing Republicans consolidating their leads in Texas and Tennessee have brought Democratic chances to win the Senate to a new low:

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The Supreme Court has perhaps always been a party political body. It’s inevitable, really, given that Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. But the Court has always attempted to maintain an impression of impartiality, and even in the modern day Chief Justice John Roberts has made it extremely clear that he wants the court to hold on to this non-partisan appearance.

However, in the bitter struggle to appoint Kavanaugh to the Court, all air of non-partisanship has dissipated. The confirmation process was transparently a partisan fight, leading voters to become only more entrenched in their opinions as Democratic approval of Kavanaugh dropped heavily through the process, whilst Republican approval of the nominee went up. Kavanaugh himself was openly partisan in the hearings with Ford, and in the final Senate vote 97 of the 98 Senators who voted did so along party lines. Despite a fleeting and slightly strange news cycle about a possibility that Trump was going to fire Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, which was probably a diversion tactic carried out by the President to draw attention away from the confirmation hearings, the eyes of the public were for weeks focused on Ford, Kavanaugh, and the Senators who would decide his fate.

So what happens if the Supreme Court comes to be viewed by the public as a strictly partisan body? Perhaps we can assume that its approval ratings will shift to match those of Trump or the GOP. Certainly during the Obama and Trump administrations, when a liberal Justice was seated Democrats came to approve of the Court much more highly, while Republicans became much more likely to disapprove of the Court, and vice-versa for a conservative Justice. It seems reasonable to predict that the confirmation battle over Kavanaugh will only reinforce this trend, and that we can expect to see approval of the Court amongst Democrats drop dramatically this year.

But what does this mean? Well, the Supreme Court has no army. Its power stems from its legitimacy, and its legitimacy stems from public opinion, which is traditionally quite favourable for the Court. When the Court ordered Nixon to release the tapes that ultimately spelled his doom, it had no power to force him to do so. The tapes were released because Nixon anticipated that the political fallout of refusing a Supreme Court order would be greater than that of simply releasing the tapes, even though he knew that releasing the tapes was very likely to result in the end of his Presidency. But this Supreme Court order was unanimously agreed upon by the Justices, in a time when the majority of Americans had a lot of faith in the Court. In the latest court and the hyper-partisan national environment, it’s hard to imagine all 9 Justices agreeing on anything at all, let alone an action against a prominent political figure. Perhaps if that decision in 1974 had been reached by a 5-4 majority in a Supreme Court viewed as a party political body, with approval ratings of around 40%, Nixon would have felt that the consequences of refusing the order were minimal. Afterall, in order to avoid removal from office all he needed was the support of most of the Republican Senators.

Moving away from the theoretical and back to the reality of the moment, will Democrats see the Supreme Court as legitimate now that Kavanaugh has been confirmed? Frankly, it seems extremely unlikely. Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh were both confirmed to the Court despite allegations of sexual assault made against them, and are both deeply conservative. The Court rules on a wide variety of issues, but perhaps the most likely to trigger a full blown legitimacy crisis are those pertaining particularly to women. The Court is likely to be make conservative rulings on issues surrounding sexual assault, gender equality, and abortion, perhaps even seeking to overturn Roe v Wade, and all of these rulings will probably be made by a 5-4 majority, where 2 members of the majority have been accused of sexual assault. Democrats will surely never respect these rulings or see them as legitimate, and by extension will perceive the Court as simply another arm of a polarised and partisan federal government. Maybe if the Democrats were to gain control of the Senate and Presidency simultaneously in the future they would even consider stacking the Court, adding perhaps another 2 liberal justices to form a 6-5 liberal majority, justifying this move by reminding voters that the GOP blocked Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland for 293 days and of course by calling upon memories of the Kavanaugh confirmation battle. If this were to happen, or the Democrats were to gain control of the Court by any other means, it seems overwhelmingly likely that Republican faith in the institution would become very low indeed.

Finally, an unpopular Supreme Court could call into question the legitimacy of the federal government as a whole. Trump’s approval stands at around 41%, Congress’s approval is a mere 18%, and hasn’t been above 50% since the beginning of the century. The majority of Americans disapprove of the President, and a vast majority disapprove of Congress, so if a majority were to disapprove of the Supreme Court, Americans would disapprove of all 3 branches of the federal government. This paints a dark picture of national politics, but perhaps it would be unsurprising. The 2016 Presidential election signalled an historic turning point. We are in a time when no quarter is asked nor given. When “bipartisanship” is little more than a buzzword used by the occasional maverick congressional candidate during election season. When every norm in politics is cast aside in favour of pursuing the most politically expedient course of action. The war for hearts and minds has reached a new level of brutality, and shows no signs of calming down.

How The GOP Just Won The Supreme Court And The Senate

Predictions as of 10/6/2018, showing a sharp change after a week’s polling and Supreme Court drama:

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Brett Kavanaugh has been confirmed to the Supreme Court of The United States by a Senate vote of 50-48. Everyone voted along party lines, with the exception of Joe Manchin, a Democrat from deep red West Virginia, voting yes. Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska simply marked herself as “present”, and Republican Steve Daines did not vote as he was at his daughter’s wedding. With this vote, the GOP has secured a conservative majority in the Supreme Court that will probably last for a decade or more. The Republican party now controls all three branches of the federal government. Simultaneously, their chances of maintaining control of the Senate in 2018 have leapt up dramatically, with polls showing them closing in on the Democrats nationally, and pulling ahead in key Senate races. How?

Put simply, Trump and Republican Senators managed to cast the Kavanaugh battle as a tipping point in a larger political war surrounding #MeToo. Until recently, the #MeToo campaign was something of a silver bullet, drawing vigorous support from Democrats and not too much ire from Republicans. But the battle for Kavanaugh’s confirmation has changed everything. Kavanaugh gave a fiery, passionate and emotional testimony declaring total innocence. Trump claimed that men are assumed to be guilty when accused with sexual assault, claiming “It’s a very scary time for young men in America”, and is one of many on the right implying that Ford is flat out lying in an attempt to bring Kavanaugh down. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham notably said during the hearings that as a single white male from South Carolina he is told he “should just shut up” when discussing issues relating to gender and sexual violence. And there has been a general Republican narrative that the GOP believes Dr Ford and considers her to be a credible witness, but also think that she is mistaken when she says she is 100% certain that her assailant was Kavanaugh.

In doing this, the Republican party has mobilised its base against #MeToo. Trump and Kavanaugh are carefully speaking to a fear of liberal culture, especially feminism, which is widespread amongst the Republican base, and was a crucial part of Trump’s victory in 2016. Lindsey Graham is seeking to relate to this base, as a Southern man who feels his voice is not being heard on these cultural issues. And the overall GOP narrative manages to absolve Kavanaugh of wrongdoing without directly insulting the sympathetic and generally respected Ford. This strategy was never going to convert Democrats or even win over undecided Independents, but it has turned the issue into a strictly partisan battle, and that is all the GOP needs. The tipping point districts in the House are almost all more Republican than the nation as a whole. The three most likely tipping point races in the Senate are Texas, North Dakota, and Tennessee, all of which are deep red states where Trump has positive approval ratings. Democrats need to win over at least some typically Republican voters in order to win the midterms, and individual Democratic candidates running for seats in Republican leaning regions are willing to make compromises on major issues such as gun control and Nancy Pelosi’s potential rise to Speaker of the House. But with Kavanaugh, the GOP convinced its supporters to take up a political stance on which Democratic candidates simply cannot compromise, and the result is political checkmate.

Take one-term Democratic incumbent Heidi Heitkamp running for re-election in North Dakota. In 2012, she won by only 2936 votes in a high turnout race. North Dakota is 17 points more Republican than the nation as a whole, and Trump’s net approval ratings there are about 5-10 points positive. Heitkamp’s choice to oppose Kavanaugh’s nomination has resulted in a huge swing against her in the polls, which have gone from dead even to giving her opponent Kevin Cramer a double-digits lead. This swing is devastating to both her campaign and the national Democratic struggle for the Senate.

Joe Manchin of West Virginia, which is 19 points more Republican than the nation as a whole, took the opposite path. He is the only Democrat in the Senate to vote to support Kavanaugh’s confirmation, and is holding on to a steady lead in the polls. A week ago Trump held a rally in West Virginia, which he used to campaign for Kavanaugh’s nomination. It is crystal clear that Trump has made the confirmation battle a key issue in the midterms, and by doing so has struck a heavy blow to the campaigns of every red state Democrat who voted against Kavanaugh’s confirmation. This includes many of the key Senate races: North Dakota, Indiana, Missouri and Montana. It also poses difficult questions for the Democratic candidates in Texas and Tennessee. It seems reasonable to guess that Trump will be visiting at least some of these states and doing everything in his power to keep voters in them thinking about Kavanaugh, and how their Democratic Senators voted against his confirmation.

Perhaps the confirmation battle will fade from memory as the unrelenting news cycle ploughs on to greater controversies. Or perhaps Kavanaugh’s confirmation with enthuse the Democratic base to turn out to vote in unusually high numbers for a midterm election. Whether one of these nor neither becomes a reality, we can expect a stream of Senate polls over the next week in red states that look at least concerning for Democrats, and our model is sure to react to those, pushing Republican chances of controlling the Senate even higher. Even if Democrats can shore up their defences in Missouri, Montana, Indiana, and Florida, as well as securing pickups in Nevada and Arizona, it’s all for nothing if they can’t win any of Texas, Tennessee, and North Dakota. And right now, all three of those are looking good for the GOP.

Do Democrats Really Have A Chance In Tennessee and Texas?

Predictions as of 10/1/2018:

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Tennessee has not had a Democratic Senator since Jim Sasser left office in 1995 having lost his re-election campaign by 14.3 percentage points, a huge defeat for an incumbent. The state hasn’t voted for a Democratic nominee for the presidency since 1996, and in 2016 Trump won in Tennessee by a full 26 points. Sure, it’s an open race, so Republicans don’t have the advantage of incumbency, but even so, any state-wide election in Tennessee should surely be an open goal for the GOP. And yet our model is giving Republican Marsha Blackburn only a 58.5% chance of winning its Senate race this year, why?

Firstly, Phil Bredesen is no normal Democratic candidate in a red state. He is a former Governor of Tennessee, and a successful one at that, winning re-election in 2006 with 69% of the vote, winning every county and more votes than any gubernatorial candidate in the history of the state, which stretches back to 1796. His reputation as a moderate Democrat makes him far more palatable amongst independents and moderate Republicans in Tennessee than a typical Democrat, and his political experience is practically unrivalled in the state. In 1991 he defeated Councilwoman Betty Nixon with 72% of the vote to become Mayor of Nashville, a position he used to invest heavily in education, building and renovating 75 schools throughout the city. In 1995, no one even ran against his campaign for re-election. His two terms as Mayor built him a formidable base in Nashville, which is incredibly significant given that Nashville’s metro area contains 1.9 million of Tennessee’s 6.7 million inhabitants (about 28%). Since his governorship, he’s been viewed as a potential Democratic presidential candidate, and was vetted for the position of Secretary of Health and Human Services in the Obama Administration. He is a political giant in only a modestly sized state.

Secondly, the national environment is leaning heavily to the left, with Democrats leading the generic congressional ballot by approximately 8.5 points. Tennessee tends to lean about 14 points to the right, taking away 8.5 from 14 leaves only a 5.5 point lead for the Republicans, which is significant, but by no means insurmountable. Add on to this Trump’s poor approval ratings and Tennessee, along with many other red states, looks a lot more competitive.

The national environment is of course also relevant in Texas (much to the distress of millions of pro-secession Texans), but intuitively speaking the state should be even more hostile to a Democratic Senate candidate than Tennessee. Texas hasn’t had a Democratic Senator since 1993 after incumbent Bob Krueger lost his re-election campaign by an impressively abysmal 34.7 points in what the Houston Chronicle called the worst campaign in the state’s modern political history. Texas hasn’t voted for a Democratic nominee for the presidency since narrowly supporting Jimmy Carter in 1976. Furthermore, the Senate seat up for election this year is guarded by none other than well known incumbent and 2016 presidential candidate Ted Cruz, armed with a net worth of over $3 million and a comfortable win in his previous election of 16.1 points, even though it occurred in a Democratic leaning national environment as it coincided with Obama’s re-election campaign. So far Cruz has raised a whopping $24 million, and is extremely keen to hold on to his seat as at the age of only 47, practically a child compared to much of the Senate, he could easily use his position as Senator to set himself up for running for President in 2024.

So how do the Democrats compete with a (comparatively) young man with a net worth of over $3 million? It’s simple, an ever so slightly younger man with a net worth of $9 million, and a proven track record of winning the unwinnable races in politics. In 2005, Beto O’Rourke defeated 2 term incumbent Anthony Cobos to win a seat on the El Paso City Council. In 2012, he ran for the Democratic nomination for the deeply left leaning 16th congressional district in Texas, facing off against 8 term Democratic incumbent Silvestre Reyes, who was endorsed by then President Barack Obama and former President Bill Clinton. Somehow, O’Rourke won the seat, and is now hoping to pull off a third extraordinary victory, seizing onto the key opportunity presented to him in 2018, with Cruz’s approval ratings as Senator going negative, Trump’s approval in Texas surprisingly low, and a heavily left-leaning national environment. Like Cruz, he’s raised $24 million, and he is swiftly fighting to gain the name-recognition he needs to compete with the now famous Cruz with talk show appearances and a campaign with an active social media presence.

Both of these races are looking extremely close, with O’Rourke trailing Cruz by only 3 or 4 points and Bredesen actually ahead of his opponent Marsha Blackburn by about 1 point. Needless to say, if Republicans were to lose either one of these seats, the consequences for them would be extreme. As discussed in a previous article on RedvBlue, Democratic incumbents in deep red seats are an absolute necessity to Democratic hopes of controlling the upper chamber of Congress. O’Rourke in particular is a huge threat to the GOP, if he were to win, he could potentially stay on in the Senate for a long time. He is young, he’s proving himself an adept campaigner, and with the advantage of incumbency could well hold on to the seat in Texas in future elections, especially as the state is becoming less and less Republican as time goes on. These two elections could very well determine who controls the Senate for the next two years or more, and both are extremely competitive.